ON T H E L O G I C O F P E R C E P T I O N S E N T E N C E S *
1. The objective of the present paper is to discuss perception sentences of the following kind:
(1) John saw Mary.
(perceives -direct object) (2) John saw Mary run.
(perceives -naked infinitive) (3)
John saw that Mary runs.
(perceived -sentential complement).
Our starting point will be Hintikka's logic of perception, as outlined in his 'On the Logic of Perception'. We shall present an interpretation of Hintikka's treatment, extend it to case (2) and defend the approach against the criticism levelled against it by Jon Barwise. Our interest will largely be philosophical in nature: many of our observations concern the underlying philosophical motivation behind the alternative approaches, rather than the technical details of them.
2. Hintikka's semantics for perception sentences applies most straightforwardly to reports with a sentential complement. It analyzes such a perception expression as a usual (one-place) intensional operator, i.e., as a restricted universal quantifier over the set of possible worlds. Thus, e.g., (3) is interpreted as (3)'.
(3)' In all possible worlds compatible with everything John (actually) saw, Mary runs.
Hintikka's proposal for an analysis of direct-object perception reports is more controversial, even given faith in possible-worlds semantics. The idea is that (1) has the following underlying logical form:
(1) ' (3x) (x = Mary & Sj (x exists)).
Here "(3x)" is Hintikka's 'perceptual' quantifier. Most of the semantically and philosophically fascinating features of the proposal are due to the peculiarities of this quantifier. "S~" is a sentential operator, interpreted in the same way as a usual modal operator (as "see that" in (3)).
One way to view the import of Hintikka's perceptual quantifier is to look at the model theory that goes together with it. (Such model theory has been studied in some detail by Niiniluoto, 1979) . The special feature of such Hintikka-style possible-worlds model theory is that the perceptual quantifier '(3x)' ranges over functions, rather than individuals. These functions, or 'world lines', pick out individuals in different possible worlds. World lines need not be constant functions.
The intuitive idea here is that Hintikka's perceptual quantifier takes as its values not individuals per se, but rather individuals as they perceptually appear to the perceiver on the given occasion. Thus Hintikka's idea is to enrich the ontology with a new ontological t y p e -a type that is related to, but not identical with, anything we customarily call 'individuals'.
It is technically straightforward to define Hintikka's possible-worlds models based on these ideas. However, it seems that the introduction of the new type of models has not led to any important insights of a purely logical nature. The interest of the proposal, therefore, has to be elsewhere.
Putting the point slightly differently, the introduction of a new type of domain to the models of one's intensional logic does not seem to help to characterize interesting new notions of logical consequence. This observation is reinforced when we note that direct-object perception reports are/ully extensional, the object position is referentially transparent. For instance, in order to cope with the validity of the inference, John saw Russell; Russell = the greatest pacifist of all time; John saw the greatest pacifist of all time; one can take "to see" as an extensional two-place predicate. In order to account for the logical consequence relation involved here, no reference to possible worlds, much less 'perceptual quantification', need be made. As far as data concerning logical inferences (such as the one above) are concerned, "to see" and other perception reports may be assigned to the same semantic category as predicates such as "to kiss" or "to kick".
These observations may seem puzzling. They may seem puzzling to anybody who endorses the following methodological principle, implicit in much of the logically minded work on the semantics of natural language:
The objective of truth-conditional (model-theoretic) semantics is to characterize, via the notion of truth, the relation of logical consequence among the expressions of the fragment of natural language one is studying.
Hintikka's semantics of perception sentences does not endorse this principle. This marks an important difference between Hintikka's semantics and any other possible-worlds approach presented in the literature (e.g., Montague's semantics).
3. One way to contrast direct-object perception reports with those with a that-complement is to take the former as nonepistemic, the latter as epistemic. This is what Barwise does, and it is not difficult to see the motivation for that move. For it seems that a direct-object perception report like (1) does not tell us anything of the perceiver's epistemic state but rather represents the speaker's viewpoint.
However, it is part and parcel of Hintikka's treatment of directobject perception reports that they do contain an implicit epistemic element. This is in fact what Hintikka's perceptual quantifier aims to bring out. According to Hintikka's analysis of (1), the direct-object perception report states something of the epistemic state of the perceiver, viz., that he perceived the object in question as an individual. (Notice that this is not to say that the perceiver perceived Mary as Mary.) It is in order to build this information into the logical form of direct-object perception reports that Hintikka introduces his perceptual quantifiers and the 'perceptual ontology' that goes together with it. Thus, the basic point is that the ontology needed for an adequate semantical analysis of direct-object perception reports is one that depends on the perceiver and his or her perceptual state on a given occasion. According to this Kantian (anti-realist) proposal, individuals, or the values of quantifiers involved in a sentence such as (1) are not independent of mind (consciousness). The ontology is not ready-made but depends on conceptual and other epistemic impositions.
What kind of semantic data concerning direct-object perception reports can be accounted for by operating with Hintikka's perceptual quantifiers? The following sentences provide a partial answer: (4) John heard the traffic. (5) John heard the air conditioning. (6) John felt the sun.
In each of these cases it is intuitively obvious that the perception report explicitly states something of the epistemic state of the perceiver; the perceiver's perceptual awareness is a necessary condition for the truth of (4)-(6). The truth of (4)- (6) is not a function of what goes on outside the perceiver's perceptual apparatus; it is not a function of what there is to perceive. Thus, the perception verbs cannot be taken as non-epistemic in these cases. In an adequate semantics for English, at least this type of direct-object perception report cannot be treated in the same way as such (fully) nonepistemic and extensional predicates as "to kiss" or "to kick". Another type of example to the same effect is provided by the following sentences:
John heard Bill and Jack and Joe and Mark. (8) John saw Bill and Jack and Joe and Mark.
There is a reading of these sentences under which the truth of the sentence does not imply that John heard (saw) each of the relevant persons individually. Under that group interpretation, the sentences explicitly tell us something of what went on in the perceiver's mind, viz., that he heard (saw) Bill and Jack and Joe and Mark as a group. The difference between the two readings is one that hinges on what went on in the perceiver's perceptual consciousness; in the two cases what there is to see is exactly the same. In the Hintikka approach where the semantics of direct-object perception reports involves an explicit epistemic element, the phenomenon just located is easy to account for. The difference between the two readings of (say) (8) is something like
It is not the existence of a group reading in connection with directobject perception reports that supports Hintikka's analysis. Of course, group readings also exist for a number of completely nonepistemic transitive verbs as well. It is the fact that the direct-object perception reports (7)- (8) intuitively do imply that the perceiver perceived the group as a group that is crucial here. This piece of epistemic information is packed into our Hintikkian semantic representations. Notice that the above considerations are compatible with the fact, already emphasized, that direct-object perception reports are fully extensional (i.e., that the syntactic object position is referentially transparent). A context can be referentially transparent, yet (semantically) epistemic and therefore intensional. That a context is extensional (by familiar tests) does not mean that it is (semantically) nonepistemic. This is the general lesson of Hintikka's analysis, it seems to me, a lesson that shows how misplaced, e.g., Quine's discussions of intensionality are bound to be.
4. We shall now extend Hintikka's treatment to perception reports with naked infinitives. The proposal we shall use is one that has already been briefly suggested by Niiniluoto (1982) . He does not discuss it in detail, however. The proposal is to translate (2) as (2)' (3e) (e = [Mary runs] & Sj (e takes place)).
Thus, perception reports with naked infinitives are taken to involve perceptual quantification over events, where the event in question is denoted by the naked-infinitive complement. The key features of this treatment are: First, according to it, a naked-infinitive perception report like (2) does not tell us how the event in question appeared to the perceiver from his perceptual viewpoint. Secondly, the perception report does tell us that the perceiver perceived the event in question as an event (as some event or other). This much the perception report does tell of the perceiver's epistemic (perceptual) state.
Our proposal views naked-infinitive perception reports as closely related to direct-object perception reports. In both cases we are dealing with perceptual quantification. That we are on the right track here is supported by the fact that the following two sentences are intuitively synonymous:
John saw Kennedy be assassinated. (naked infinitive) (10)
John saw the assassination of Kennedy. (direct object)
It is straightforward to develop more technically the semantics just described, i.e., to develop the relevant kind of model theory. What is called for is a new type of domain: a domain containing functions that pick out events in different possible worlds. We shall not go into the details here.
According to the present semantics, there are two crucial differences between perception reports with naked infinitives and those with sentential complements. Those differences can be brought out by contrasting the following two sentences:
John saw a dance performance take place. (12) John saw that a dance performance took place.
Recall that according to the Hintikka-style possible-worlds semantics, (12) says only that in each world compatible with everything John saw, a dance performance takes place. No perceptual quantification is involved in (12).
Thus, the two crucial differences between the semantics of (11) and (12) These two differences between perceive-that and perceive-naked infinitive sentences, which immediately follow from our analysis, are readily confirmed by intuition. It is clearly the case that (11) and (12) are logically independent of one another (neither implies the other). Perceive-that is not a "stronger form" of perceive-naked infinitive.
One advantage of this approach is that it yields a unified treatment of each of the three types of perception sentences (1)-(3). Only one interpretation for the perception verbs is used, viz., an interpretation that takes the verbs as introducing a set 'of possible worlds. Thus, there is just one expression for each perception verb in the logical syntax of the present Hintikkian perception logic. The translation of each of (1)-(3) feature the same operator Sj.
In spite of this unified interpretation of the perception verbs themselves, the use of Hintikka's perceptual quantifier helps to bring out various interesting peculiarities of the different perception contexts.
For instance, it is a fact of English that so-called habituals are not acceptable as complements of naked-infinitive perception reports, but they are acceptable as corresponding that-complements:
John saw Mary play tennis. John saw that Mary plays tennis.
(13) does not have a reading under which John saw Mary have a certain habit, viz., the habit of playing tennis. Such a reading of course exists for (14).
An explanation for this phenomenon is forthcoming in our semantics. According to our analysis, naked infinitives involve perceptual quantification,, i.e., for the truth of (13), John must have seen the actual event of Mary playing tennis as some event or other. Thus John must have laid his eyes on that actual event. In contrast to this, (14) does not involve perceptual quantification; it only says that in each possible world compatible with everything John saw, Mary plays tennis. This requirement can be fulfilled even if John never laid his eyes on Mary playing tennis. Thus, he could have seen Mary's tennis equipment and have concluded on that basis, that she has the habit of playing tennis.
Similarly, our semantics can help to explain why tenses behave differently vis-a-vis perception sentences with naked infinitives, as contrasted to those with that-complements. To repeat, a necessary condition for the truth of a naked-infinitive perception report is that the perceiver perceived something as an event. This condition is not fulfilled if the perception and the event in question do not take place simultaneously (even partially). Examples are provided by Thus, if we try to embed tense operators into the naked-infinitive complement, nonsense results. Again, since the corresponding thatcomplement sentences do not involve perceptual quantifications by our analysis, similar constraints should not be found there. This prediction is readily fulfilled, as can be seen from the following: (17) John saw that Mary had run. (18) John saw that Mary was going to run.
Of course it is possible to explain these data syntactically. However, it seems to me that a semantics that yields (syntactically) unacceptable sentences as nonsense is preferable to one that doesn't. In any case, it seems to me that the phenomenon just mentioned provides evidence for the view that Hintikka's perceptual quantifiers are structures that the semantics of English recognizes. 5. A completely different approach to perception sentences with naked infinitives has been recently presented by Jon Barwise. Barwise's proposal is hard to pin down in detail but the key features seem to be the following:
Naked-infinitive perception reports are epistemologicaUy neutral in that they do not tell us anything of what went on in the perceiver's head (consciousness) at the time of the perception; (b) Naked-infinitive perception reports are analyzed as relations between a perceiver and a scene, where a scene is part of what is actually the case. These features emphasize the "realist" philosophy underlying Barwise's semantics. In the semantic representation for nakedinfinitive perception reports, there is no reference to entities that depend on the perceiver's perceptual consciousness or epistemic state. Rather, the semantics of (say) (2) involves a relation between a perceiver (John) and an event which is 'out there', i.e., part of the furniture of a 'ready-made' world.
This starting point of Barwise's analysis, it seems to me, is mistaken. Even though naked-infinitive perception reports do not have a de dicto reading properly so-called, there is an epistemic element involved in their semantics that is not recognized by Barwise. Consider the following:
(19) John saw Mary move.
Barwise's account runs somewhat as follows. The truth of (19) (Barwise, 1981, pp. 390-1) Thus, according to Barwise's account, as long as we are interested in the semantics of naked-infinitive perception reports, no reference to how the perceiver happens to conceptualize the relevant flow of light into his eyes need be made. What goes on in the perceiver's head is relevant only for the semantics of "epistemically positive perceptual results", such as 'sees that'.
But surely this position is untenable. For suppose John, who looks exactly like an ordinary human being, is in reality a Martian. His perceptual system works like a hypersensitive microscope. Consequently, the light entering his eyes projects in his mind a panorama of ever moving particles of all kinds and descriptions, here floating around, there spinning with unbelievable velocity. But, most important, we can suppose, the process that we conceptualize on the macrolevel as Mary's movement does not form any distinguishable process whatever on the microlevel on which the Martian operates. The Martian sees just a sea of moving microparticles everywhere: the bunch of them that actually constitutes Mary and her movement does not take any particular, distinguishable form on this level of consideration.
Would we say that (19) is true? I think not. Not even though the 'scene' is out there right in front of the Martian, reflecting light into his eyes in the right way. But what is going on inside the Martian's head renders (19) false; he does not conceptualize the flow of light that enters his eyes in the right way; the "incredibly complex chain of electrochemical activity" that the light brings about is not of the right kind. Yet all of this is what we can ignore, according to Barwise, when considering the semantics of (19)! A similar type of case is provided by the behavior of a baby's perceptual system. Suppose John is a baby and Mary is in front of him, moving toward him. The light rays are entering the baby's eyes. However, the baby does not see anything coherent at all. His illdeveloped conceptual system takes the incoming light rays not unlike we would take a series of completely unrelated pictures. Would we say that the baby saw Mary move and that therefore (19) is true? I think not. And again for the same reason as in the case of the Martian: because what was 'out there' (the 'scene') did not affect the baby in the right way; the baby did not conceptualize the 'scene' as a separate, distinguishable event at all. Thus again for the truth of a naked-infinitive perception report, what went on in the perceiver's head is crucial, viz., the epistemic element Barwise explicitly ignores in his analysis.
In contrast, our Hintikkian analysis works straightforwardly in the above cases. The translation of (19) yields the following logical form for it:
(3e)(e = [Mary moves] & Sj (e takes place)).
The first conjunct guarantees that there is something of the right kind 'out there', an event outside John's perceptual consciousness that does not depend on John or his perceptual viewpoint. But in addition-and this is the element lacking in Barwise's analysisthis event is connected with the perceiver and his viewpoint.. This is guaranteed by the Hintikkian perceptual quantifier that binds (from outside) a free variable inside the scope of the perception context Sj. This second feature of our analysis provides the epistemic element that is lacking from Barwise's analysis. The truth of (19)' requires that John saw the event of Mary moving as some event or other, i.e., as a separate, distinguishable event. This condition is not fulfilled in either one of the above examples. Thus (19)' is false, just as it should be.
These considerations suggest a more general moral for semantics, a moral that is closely related to the general point we made in our discussion of direct-object perception reports: There are semantically significant epistemic elements in natural language which are independent of customary scope distinctions. In spite of the fact that the sense of the complement clause "Mary run" in (2) is the speaker's, not the perceiver's, the perceiver's perceptual vantage point has to be accounted for in an adequate semantics for (2). This is achieved by the use of Hintikka's perceptual quantifiers.
6. We shall now turn to a discussion of an argument that Barwise has presented in an attempt to refute a Hintikka-style possible-worlds semantics for perception sentences. The argument is an application of a well-known problem: how to distinguish logical equivalent sentences in possible-worlds semantics. Barwise's argument runs as follows (a)
The following sentences are logically equivalent: (a. But of course there is no temptation to hold this inference as valid. Neither is it valid in the model theory for the perceptual quantifier presented in the literature. (See, e.g., Niiniluoto, 1979.) Thus Barwise's main argument against a Hintikka-style possibleworlds semantics for perception sentences collapses.
7. I shall conclude this paper by considering an interesting peculiarity of naked-infinitive perception reports.
It has already been mentioned that naked-infinitive perception reports seem to differ sharply from the corresponding that-complement reports in that the complement clause of the former represents the speaker's, not the perceiver's point of view. Barwise goes on further to argue for a fundamental dissimilarity between the two types of sentences. In particular, he argues that (i) in the complement clause of a naked-infinitive perception report co-referential terms are interchangeable; (ii) the contexts do not demonstrate quantifier scope ambiguities.
While Barwise is clearly on the right track here, it seems that one interesting feature of naked-infinitive perception reports has gone unnoticed by him: these contexts do exhibit a peculiar kind of quantifier scope ambiguity. Consider (22) John saw everyone in the room leave.
It seems to me this sentence demonstrates the following scope ambiguity:
(23) Everyone in the room is such that John saw him leave; (24) John saw everyone in the room leave (together).
The ambiguity is whether John saw everyone leave as a group or individually. The two readings are naturally expressed in our framework by the following:
(24)' (3e) (e = [everyone in the rooms leaves] & Sj (e takes place)). These semantic representations are arrived at by first identifying a structural ambiguity in (22) concerning the scope of the NP 'everyone in the room' and then applying the canonical analysis to the two alternative forms. However, if a scope ambiguity is not recognized in (22), it seems hard to explain where the two readings come from. This ambiguity is somewhat different from usual scope ambiguities. Contrast (25) John wanted many women to leave; (26) John saw many women leave.
In the first case, under the small scope reading the determiner "many" is taken by John's, not the speaker's, count. In contrast, in the small scope reading of (26) many women is taken by the speaker's count. It is only that the event of many women leaving is seen by John as one complex event involving a group of individuals; it is irrelevant whether he saw many women involved. Notice how naturally our semantic theory captures the present ambiguity. The use of Hintikka's perceptual quantifier guarantees that the perceiver perceives the event in question as an event. The difference between the two readings lies in how the perceiver perceived the event, viz., whether he saw a complex event containing a number of individuals as constituents or an event containing just one individual as a constituent.
The main interest of these examples is that they demonstrate again that naked-infinitive perception reports cannot be interpreted by a straightforward rule that maps the complement clause into the "world" (model) and then says that the result is what was perceived.
That part of what is actually the case and picked out by the complement clause is not the semantically exhaustive object of perception. The interplay of the perception verb and the complement clause is crucial, just like it is crucial in the other cases we considered above. In this paper, I have tried to argue that the Hintikka-style possibleworlds semantics for perception sentences is a natural framework to characterize such subtleties of perception sentences.
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